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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the move to offset printing from letterpress in the U.S. daily newspaper
publishing industry was determined, in part, by the structure of the local market. Although in
monopoly markets, low circulation papers were quicker to adopt than high circulation papers, the
ranking was reversed within duopoly markets. In such markets, the smaller firms adopted four years
later than the larger one did. This result is partially consistent with preemption models of adoption.
Hazard analysis further shows that in markets in which one firm has exited, the remaining duopolist
is less likely to adopt than otherwise, consistent with preemption, and at odds with a declining
industry explanation. Further analysis shows that the adoption was determined, at least in part, at
the firm rather than the newspaper level, although, on the whole, newspaper chains adopted neither
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This paper considers the nature of technological adoption by
examining the decision to invest in offset presses among newspapers
from 1964-1977. In particular, it estimates the effect of the degree
of competition on the adoption decision. The results are,in part,
consistent with the theoretical literature on preemption. The
newspaper industry is useful to studyboth because its product -the
simultaneous provision of news and advertising to consumers on a
daily basis -hasremained essentially unchanged for many years, and
because, in the United States, the markets are local, thus providing
variation in market structure.
Until the 1960s, essentially all newspapers were composed by
linotype and printed by stereotype and letterpress,both late
nineteenth century technologies. The linotype machine cast metal
slugs of each line of the newspaper; the slugs were thenassembled in
a galley, which would be used to create a cardboard impression on a
mat.The mat was first curved to fit around a cylinder, then
injected with lead and finally fitted around a press cylinder.Each
rotation of the latter would impress the text on the newsprint.
In the early l960s, a pair of new technologies began to diffuse
throughout the industry. In photocomposition, the text is composed
on a machine that projects the letters, and then photographs them. In
offset printing, a plate made from the resulting negative is mounted
on a cylinder, which is then immersed in ink. The ink is taken up by
the exposed area only; these are transferred to a second, rubber-
blanked cylinder which then transfers them to the newsprint (thus
offsetting it) .Bothtechnologies had been developed outside of the
industry, and first deployed in the book and pamphlet publishing
industry.
2These new technologies promised a numberof advantages over the
old. Photocomposition reduced the typesettingtime initially by some
700 percent, and later, as it itself was improved,by several orders
of magnitude. Its use eliminated the time and labor previously
spent on positioning the typesand plates for letterpresses, and the
proper adjustment of the platesfor impression (make-ready)
Offset produced a greater quality image, as one canachieve a
much smaller dot, and so greater resolution,with offset than with
letterpress (though that advantagehas decreased over time, as
letterpress has improved) .Pictureimages were especially enhanced
(Tripsas, 1996, p. 61); advertisersin particular liked offset
printing.Although offset reduced preparation timefor picture
images (Tripsas, 1996, p. 61) ,overallit was a more expensive
technology to use. The quality improvement wasat the cost of more
frequent downtime for the pressesfor cleaning, a three to five
percent higher wastage of newsprintand ink costs that are from three
to seven times as great (both due to more expensiveink and greater
usage) 2 The additional newsprint andink costs amounted to a ten
percent increase in expenditure.
To sum up, photocomposition greatly reducedthose costs that
were fixed with respect to circulation,and variable with respect to
pages; while offset led to higherquality at the expense of an
increase in costs that were variable with respect tothe product of
circulation and the number of pages. Overall, thecombined adoption
In practice, the labor saving in newspaper publishing wasnot
necessarily as great. Employment in the BostonGlobe's composing
room fell from 500 employees in the early1970s to 140 today. But
much of the present day staff is clearly excess labor,and older
workers who have guaranteed lifetime contracts.
2 Editor and publisher, April 9, 1966, and June 11, 1966.
3of photocomposition and offset usually implied savings, not including
the investment costs.
These two technologies are highly complementary.This was
especially true where picture images were involved; letterpress
technology required them to be "photoengraved as copper or zinc cuts,
and then mounted on wooden blocks" (Tripsas, 1996, p. 69), which was
a lengthy procedure, whereas with photocomposition and offset, the
photographic image could be easily combined with the image of the
text, and then exposed on a printing plate. Furthermore,offset
printing without photocomposition is very awkward, requiring "a
series of elaborate and costly conversion techniques providing an
equivalent of a photographic position from metal. Quality suffers as
a result since positive type images are susceptible to irregular
impressions."(Scott, p.31). Indeed, offset presses were
manufactured solely for use with photocomposition. However, there
are substantial savings to photocomposition even without offset
printing, and although trade articles in the 1960s often spoke of the
two technologies interchangeably, many newspapers, especially the
larger ones, initially adopted photocomposition without offset.3
Offset printing itself is, in fact, composed of two separate
technologies: offset (the interposition of an additional, blanket
cylinder) and lithography (the flat plate which uses the chemistry of
ink and water to transfer the image) .Ahybrid system named Dilitho
(for "direct lithography") promised to yield the higher quality of
offset without the need for new offset presses. Although adopted by
a number of the larger newspapers, overall it seems to have been a
failure. It was apparently "too messy" a printing method. However,
See, e.g., Editor and Publisher, November 11, 1960 for an
advertisement that explains to the reader how photocomposition
can be used with letterpress.
4most installations of Dilitho, if not all, appear to have occurred
after the period of observation, and so that technology will not play
a role in the subsequent analysis.
Adoption of offset technology was, and remains, costly.
Presses are long-lived investments, and can last from fifteen to
forty years.They take some two years to install, in large part
because of the need to install the new presses in a way that will
allow the old ones to continue to operate. They are also costly. In
1972, an offset press for a paper with a circulation of 50,000 to
100,000, cost around 1.2 million dollars, or on the order of one-
tenth of yearly revenues (Compaine, p. 130) .Conversioncosts would
be another couple of hundred thousands of dollars.
In what follows, I will consider only the adoption of offset
printing. This is not a reflection of the relative importance of the
two. Photocomposition may well have been the more important of the
two. Indeed, while newspapers were relatively early in the adoption
of photocomposition,4 among all printing industries, they were rather
late in adoption of offset printing. (Scott, p. 30) .Rather,the
data for the adoption of offset printing is more readily available
than that for photocomposition.5
IIDETERMINANTSOF ADOPTION OF OFFSET PRINTING
Thefirst U.S. newspaper to move to offset was the Opelousas
Daily World, a small newspaper in Louisiana, which started printing
Photocomposition was first used for telephone directories, and
in fact was designed with that use in mind.
5See Dertouzos and Quinn for an analysis of the adoption of
photocomposition and video display terminal. They use a somewhat
different time period (1972-1982 and 1979-1982, respectively)
and a much smaller sample of 200 firms. They do not consider the
degree of competition in the market.
5by offset in 1939 (Featherston, 1977) .Perhapsin part because it
still relied on the old typesetting technology,and not
photocomposition, it had no imitators for the next twelve years.
Appreciable adoption of the technology did not begin until the early
1960s. By 1964, the first year that Editor and Publisher
International Yearbook lists the "offset" newspapers, about 6 percent
of newspapers were using offset. Thereafter, about seventy
newspapers a year moved to the new technology. By 1977, the fraction
of adopters had increased to two-thirds.(See Figure 1)
The clearest pattern in adoption is in newspaper size, as
measured by circulation.Smaller newspapers adopted much earlier
than larger ones, as Figure 2, which shows the median adopter size,
by year, indicates.For example, in 1965, the highest circulation
paper printing by offset was the Oklahoma Journal, with a circulation
of about 71,000; the second highest had a circulation of some 40,500.
The New York Times only announced its move to offset printing in
1977, and did not do so until 1979. The Boston Globe only moved to
offset twelve years ago (although it had adopted Dilitho before
that); and before 1977, the largest offset newspaper was the St.
Louis Dispatch (circulation 267,000)
The delay in adoption by large newspapers was necessarily
driven, at least in part, by the technological limits of the new
offset presses, which ran much more slowly than the existing
letterpresses.The first newspaper offset press manufactured by
Gross, in 1960, the leading offset press manufacturer, had a rated
maximum speed of 12,000 papers per hour (Editor and Publisher, April
1960) .Thisis far below the requirements of a large newspaper, with
say a circulation of a few hundred thousand, and five hours in which
to print them,(The Boston Globe, which has a 10:30 p.m. deadline,
6tries to publish in this time frame today, so that its delivery
trucks can leave the plant before dawn.)In principle a large
newspaper could have substituted manyoffset presses for a few
letterpresses. However, there are substantial costs that are
variable with the number of presses but fixed with the respect to the
output of each, principally the wages of the pressmenand the
maintenance workers, so that this approach would not have been
profitable. Furthermore, a press run at the maximum speedwould
produce a much lower quality paper; the actual speeds atwhich
presses were operated at were perhaps as much as forty percentless.6
As times passed, more and more newspapers were "eligible" for
offset printing. In 1963, Gross was manufacturing a 30,000 paper per
hour offset press. In 1970, it offered a press with a maximum speed
of 60,000 papers per hour. Still, letterpress was faster. In that
same year, Gross offered a letterpress with a speed of 80,000 papers
per hour. Aside from the technological limits,offset was relatively
more expensive to operate than letterpress, given the higher
newspaper wastage rates and ink expenditures.
A natural presumption would be that the larger papers were
thwarted in the move to the new technology by powerful unions.
Newspapers have since the end of the last century been highly
unionized, and management must negotiate with several unions
simultaneously. Even today, The Boston Globe, for example, has some
seventeen unions, of which it must negotiate contracts with twelve.
6Editorand Publisher, September 8, 1962, p. 54. The 40 percent
figure is offered by the Vice-President of a company that sold
offset presses. In the early years of the technology, offset
plates did not last long, and so could only be used for short
press runs. However, this was essentially solved by 1960 (Editor
and Publisher, July 1960, p. 12)
7At the time, unions often hadsubstantial jurisdiction over job
definition.7
The role of unions may have been importantin the adoption of
photocomposition. That technology was athreat to unions since it
dramatically decreased the number of workersrequired, and thus
provided a substantial cost saving to management,given the high
union wages earned. Indeed, under the old technology"the composing
room [was] likely to exceed the costof any other department"
(Davidson and Roy, 1960, p. 787-8.) A related concernto the union
was the elimination of both theirmembers' intrinsic skills (i.e.,
the strength to move massive galleys) andtheir accumulated ones.
Compaine (1980) blames unions for thereluctance of newspapers in
major cities to move to "cold-type" before1976. Photocomposition
did precipitate a general strike among newspaperworkers in New York
in the early 1960s,8 and one sees in the TypographicalJournal, the
union magazine of the International Typographical Union,resistance
to the new technology during this period.
However this explanation does not necessarily carry overto
offset printing.The relevant union there was the International
Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union (IPPAU) .Itwas, in general,
sympathetic to the new technology, having foughtfor jurisdiction
over it within the AFL-CIO since 1913 (TheAmerican Pressmen,
February 1960, p. 21) and maintained a center for trainingin the use
Since then, many newspapers, such as the Globe, have won full
rights to reassign workers, in return for lifetime job guarantees.
8flertouzos and Quinn (1985) report that "[i]n 1964, the New York
Times and the Daily News purchased the latest generation of
computer equipment, an IBM Model 1620, only to encounterstiff
opposition from the powerful ITU Local Number 6. Both units sat
idle in basements until long after they had become
technologically obsolete."
8of the technology for its members for some time. In contrast to the
articles about photocomposition in the Typographical Journal, those
in the American Pressmen were quite positive about the new offset
technology.
III COMPETITION AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADOPTION
Our main interest in this paper is on the effect of competition
on the speed of technological adoption. One would expect thefirst
firm in a duopoly to adopt to do so at an earlier date than a
similarly sized single-newspaper monopolist. First, compared to a
monopolist with the same circulation, a duopolist has a greater
stand-alone incentive (Katz and Shapiro, 1987) .Thisis the payoff
from adoption when the rival firm can not also innovate. Whereas both
the monopolist and the duopolist benefit from the increased
willingness to pay of their existing customers, the duopolist will
also be able to steal away some customers from its rival. Second, a
duopolist has a preemption incentive to innovate before its rival
does.This incentive arises out of the loss in flow profits
(principally, market share) from prior adoption by the rival.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) have shown that the preemption incentive
leads to earlier adoption than under monopoly situations.9
In contrast, the second firm to adopt in the market is likely
to do so later than a similarly sized monopolist. In the simplified
models of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Tirole (1992), where
because of Bertrand competition the gain to adopting second is zero,
the second firm in fact never adopts. In the more general model of
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) also find a 'late adoption"
equilibrium, but this is only possible when response is
immediate, an inappropriate assumption for an environment in
which installation of the new technology takes two years.
9Riordan (1992), where duopoly profits when both firms have adopted
are potentially positive, the second firm adopts late because the
increase in flow profits as a second adopter is less than the
increase obtained as a first adopter. That is an assumption of the
model, but it would seem appropriate for the newspaper market, if
consumers' reading habits are habitual, i.e., there are switching
costs. The improvement in quality inherent in offset may be
sufficient to offset these switching costs, so that the first adopter
draws readers away from the other firm -butthese costs might still
be large enough to deter these readers (and new readers) from
returning to the other firm when it, too, adopts.
One can also ask which firm is likely to adopt first. Clearly,
the smaller firm has a stronger stand alone incentive. Because of its
smaller circulation level,its adoption costs arelower.
Furthermore, as it starts from a smaller market share, it has a
greater opportunity to increase it through adoption.'° However, the
larger firm probably has the stronger preemption incentive.The
logic is similar to that of Gilbert and Mewberry (1982), who show
that the gain to a monopolist of winning a patent race is greater
than the gain to an entrant whose win of that race would destroy the
monopoly. So long as industry profits are greater when the larger
firm is the only adopter than when the smaller firm is the only
adopter, the former will have the greater preemption incentive."
'°Thisis a generalization of Arrow's (1962) replacement effect.
"Vickers (1986) provides a Cournot example in which the small
(i.e., high cost) firm has the greater preemption incentive to
adopt a cost-reducing technology. However, in that model,
adoption is always to the frontier technology, so that marginal
cost for the adopter is the same regardless of its position
before adoption. An analogous assumption in the present case
would have offset not only increasing the physical quality of the
paper, but also eliminating any other disadvantage of the small
paper that gave it a smaller market share to begin with.
10Thus, the possibility arises that the preemption incentive will
be greater for the larger firm, and sufficiently greater than it
predominates the stand alone incentive, so that the large firm will
adopt first.
Although the empirical literature on the relationship between
innovation and market structure is quite large, the literature on the
relationship between adoption and market structure is small. Joskow
and Rose count as a virtue that the electric utilities they are
examining are regulated monopolists, so that strategic considerations
can be abstracted from. In examining the diffusion of oxygen, Oster
works within the single market of steel with no attempt to define
geographic or product sub-markets that might exhibit variation in
structure. Stoneman and Karshensas attempt to measure these effects
by the stock of previous adopters.However, although they are
ostensibly interested in testing models of adoption under oligopoly,
their defined markets include, on average, about a hundred firms. Of
course, the vast literature on adoption of new hybrids and technology
in agriculture (e.g., Grilliches, 1957) concerns a competitive
market. One exception to this general pattern of neglect is Saloner
and Shepard, who in their study of the installation of Automated
Teller Machines include a state-wide Herfindahi Index of bank
concentration. They find that adoption is faster in more
concentrated states, which finding they attribute to the greater
internalization of network effects (the focus of their study) in
concentrated markets.
IV. DATA
The primary data for this project are derived from the yearbook
of Editor and Publisher, an industry trade weekly.It publishes a
yearly listing of newspapers, that details circulation, advertising
11price, circulation price and mechanical specification.I use 1960
values for the independent variables. Offset status for the years
1964-1977 are taken from yearly listings of newspapers that adopted
the technology that Editor and Publisher published for those years.
Offset status for later years are available from the mechanical
specifications given for each newspaper, but they are moretime
consuming to transcribe and input, and are not used in thisdraft.
Later years also introduce the complication of the adoption ofthe
Dilitho process will enter, although that could be handled within a
competing hazard framework.
Pressmen status is taken from listings of the newspaper chapels
of the International Pressmen and Pressmen's Assistants Union (IPPAU)
in The American Pressman, the union's official journal.
In cases where two newspapers are owned by the same firm, I
assume that they are printed on the same press. The assumptionis
necessary since in certain years, Editor andPublisher seem to list
only one of the two papers, and in other years, they list both. In
the mechanical specifications, only one description of presses and
other equipment is given for both newspapers.This suggests that
both newspapersare,indeed, printed on the same press.
Occasionally, however two types of presses are listed, and it is
impossible to know whether presses are dedicated to particular
newspapers or not.
One must also decide how to measure circulation where two
newspapers in a given market are published by the samefirm. The
appropriate measure depends on the manner in which high circulation
thwarted adoption. Recall that offset required more expensive ink
and entailed higher wastage of newsprint, thus increasing variable
costs. Obviously, if this was the dominant impediment to adoption
for high circulation firms, than the appropriate measure would be the
sum of the two newspaperst circulation.
12Another reason that large newspapers were late to adoptwas the
slowness of the offset presses. Here the appropriatemeasure depends
upon the degree of rivalry(in the private/public good sense) in
printing the two newspapers.Were the two newspapers printed on
different presses, clearly one would want to measurecirculation as
each newspaper's circulation. Were they printed onthe same press
(which I am assuming, and seems usually tobe the case) ,onemight
still want to use this measure, if, say, the printingof an evening
paper does not increase the costof printing a higher circulation
morning paper.But to the extent that there is a substantial
required down-time for presses, as for maintenance,using the sum of
the circulation of both newspapers would be appropriate.I will
presents results primarily under the specificationof the sum of the
circulation, but will also show how they changewhen individual
circulation numbers are used instead.
Table 1 lists the number of observations for eachmarket
structure. The vast majority is single newspapermarkets. There are
124 duopolists, representing 62 markets, and 193 two-newspaper
monopolists, representing the same number ofmarkets.I use one
observation for each two-newspaper monopoly market, since thevalue
of the dependant variable is identical for both newspapersin such
markets.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the remaining
variables.Average log circulation corresponds to acirculation
level of about 11,000; at about 9,500, the median circulationlevel
is somewhat less, and observations range from a circulation of 400 to
almost half a million. Some 40% of newspapers belong to a chain,the
largest of which had (in 1960) eighteen newspapers. Only4 percent
of newspapers were in markets with newspaper locals of the IPPALIJ.
13V. ESTIMATION
Because not all newspapers adoptoffset during the 1964-1977
period (or ever -theChicago Tribune, for example, has neverdone
so) ,andothers close down, or merge, before everadopting, some
method for handling the censoring mustbe used. I assume a latent
variable indicating adoption year in theabsence of these censoring
events, and assume that the error term,representing the difference
between this latent variable and its expectedvariable conditional on
a set of independent variables,follows a normal distribution. This
leads to the log-likelihood function:
(1- L -R)f(y-bx/s)/s+ LlnF(y-bx/S) + Rln[l-F(y-bX/5)
where y is the date of adoption or censoring,x is the vector of
independent determinants, b is aconformable vector, s is the
standard deviation of the uncensored error term,f is the standard
normal p.d.f., F is the standard normal c.d.f,R is a dummy variable
equal to one if y is right censored, orif the newspaper merged or
ceased to publish before adoption, and L is a dummyvariable equal to
one if the newspaper had adopted by1964 (as no pre-1964 information
on offset use is available)
12
Table 3 shows the results. Column (1) includes the basic
market structure variables, and log circulation(measured as the log
of the sum of circulations for two-newspapermonopolists) .Asto be
expected, high circulation papers areshown to adopt later: a paper
with a circulation of 100,000 will adopt somesix years later (lnlO
times 2.5) than a paper with a circulation of 10,000,and a million
12 In principle, the log-likelihood specification should allow for
correlation between two duopolists in the same market.The log-
likelihood function will be thus amended in futuredrafts.
14circulation paper will adopt another six years after that. Holding
circulation constant, a single-newspaper monopoly is shown to adopt
earliest. Two-newspaper monopolies adopt a year later, although the
difference is insignificant. In contrast, a duopolist adopts almost
three years later than a single-newspaper monopolist. At almost six
years, the standard error of the equation is large, if one recalls
that two-thirds of all newspapers moved to offset printing in
slightly more than twice that time.
To check the sensitivity of the results to the definition of
the circulation variable in two-newspaper markets, column (2) uses
the alternative specification of the average of the two newspapers'
log-circulation. The major effect is an increase in the coefficient
on two-newspaper Monopoly status -hardlya surprising result, given
that the new specification decreases a variable with a positive
coefficient only in the two-newspaper Monopoly case. Now, the two-
newspaper monopolist is predicted to adopt almost three years later
than a single-firm monopolist, and the difference is significant. No
conclusions can be drawn without some evidence on the degree to which
presses are dedicated to specific newspapers, although my sense is
that the specification in the first column is to be preferred.
Nonetheless, this column is useful as it shows the robustness of the
remaining estimates to the specification choice. As it is always the
case that only the coefficient on the two-newspaper monopolist dummy
is effected by the specification change, I will only report results
using the first specification from here on in.
Of course, markets with either a duopoly or two-newspaper
monopoly are otherwise different from those with a single-newspaper
monopoly; the former are typically bigger. I capture the size of the
market by the log of the total circulation of the market. This proxy
is appropriate so long as circulation price does not fall too much
with the introduction of a second firm and demand is not too elastic
15with respect to that price. The first condition has been shown to be
true in related, but as yet unpublished, research, and the second
seems reasonable.(Measures of county population and income are
immune from this endogeneity problem, but I have been not been able
to obtain those data in electronic form for 1960 yet; I have used the
1969 data and the results are very similar to those using the log of
total circulation, although matching difficulties reduce the size of
the sample substantially.)
With the inclusion of the log of total circulation in column
(3), the coefficient on duopoly falls to less than two additional
years, and is insignificant from zero.The coefficient on two-
newspaper monopoly is unchanged from column (1) .Howeverthe
coefficient on log total circulation itself is insignificant.
Column (4)substitutes a finer measure of competition,
DUOHHI=DUO*(lHHI)*2, where DUO is the duopoly dummy, and HHI is the
Herfindahl index, using the share of each newspaper's circulation.
This variables ranges from zero, for a non-duopoly or a duopoly with
a negligible second firm, to one, for a symmetric duopoly.The
results are quite similar to the other columns.
To explore further the nature of the adoption lag in duopoly
markets relative to single newspaper markets, column (5) introduces
a dummy variable for the smaller firm in a duopoly. Thus the smaller
duopoly firm is estimated to adopt later than a single-newspaper
monopolist by the sum of the coefficient on that variable and the
coefficient on duopoly status. The result is quite dramatic. The
smaller firm in a duopoly is estimated to adopt some 5 years later
than a similarly sized monopoly firm, while the larger firm is
estimated to adopt at the same time as its single-newspaper monopoly
counterpart. These results are not effected by the inclusion of log
-total circulation in column (6)
16In fact, these numbers predict that the smaller firm will, on
average, adopt later than the larger firm, given that the difference
in log circulation is, on average, .8, and the coefficient on the log
circulation is 2.5.'The raw numbers are in support of this
contention. Figure 3 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival
curves (the percentage of newspapers who have yet to adopt by a given
date, given they have not exited the industry) for duopolists. That
of the smaller firm almost always exceeds that of the larger firm.
Likewise, a censored regression estimation restricted to the set of
duopoly markets predicts that the smaller firm will adopt four years
later (p-value =.07)
Clearly, then, technological or demand considerations are not
the sole determinant of adoption. Market structure also plays a role.
How do these results compare to the theoretical predictions of
preemption? Neither the large nor the small firm are predicted to
adopt earlier than their monopolist counterpart, although the
standard error on Duopoly in Column (6) is sufficiently great that a
lead of nine months over adoption by a single-newspaper monopolist
can not be rejected at the five percent level. That the small firm
adopts, on average, later is consistent with a strong preemption
incentive on the part of the larger firm.
An alternative explanation is that the continuation of a second
newspaper in any market was in doubt throughout this period. The
1960s and 1970s saw a decline in the number of duopolies. A single-
newspaper monopolist could be relatively assured of continuation in
the market. But a duopolist would have been afraid that it might
I have also considered whether the degree of competition as
measured by whether the two duopolists are competing head to head
(that is, both are morning or both are evening newspapers) matters,
by separately categorizing duopoly markets accordingly. It does
not.
17have to exit the market (the number of duopoly markets was halved
over our time period), and that would especially be trueof the
smaller of the two firms.14 There is a resale market for presses,
but it is far from perfect. (The Boston Globe sold some of its
presses to the Boston Herald when itmoved to offset, and junked
others)
The preemption and declining industry explanations can be
distinguished by considering how the exit of one of the two
duopolists effects the adoption decision of the remaining firm. To
check that, the model was re-estimated by Cox's partial likelihood
method, assuming a proportional hazards model with time varying
covariates.The results are presented in Table 4.Column (1)
repeats the analysis of the preceding table in ahazard framework
(all variables are measured at their 1960 values) .Theseresults are
qualitatively the same as those presented earlier.For example,
higher circulation is shown to lead to a lower hazard rateof
adoption, equivalent to a higher expected time to adoption. Also,
the small duopolist has an adoption hazard that is only .24 (=.6X
.4) that of a single newspaper, which implies, under a constant
hazard assumption, an expected lag of four years.
In column (2), an additional variable, "Former Duopoly" is
added.This takes the value one for a market that had two
independent newspapers in 1960, but presently has only one newspaper
'4Related work shows that whereas in 1972 the one-firm and two-
firm entry-threshholds (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991) were
population levels of 63,000 and 997,000, respectively, in 1982
they were 70,000 and 1,797,000, respectively. Here n-firm entry-
threshholds are calculated as the population level at which the
probability of there being n or more firms (calculated from
kernel regressions) is one-half.
18due to the (non-merger) exit of one of the firms.'5 The estimate
indicates that a duopolist that has yet to adopt is less likely to
adopt if its rival has exited, but the coefficient is insignificant.
The effect becomes marginally significant (at the 13 percent level)
when "Prior Adoption", a dummy variable that takes the value one if
their has been a prior adoption in the market, is included in Column
(3) .(Clearlythis variable can only take the value one in the case
of a duopoly.)This is inconsistent with the declining industry
explanation: once the rival is gone, the remaining firm, more certain
of its continued survival, should be more willing to undertake costly
investment. It is consistent with a preemption explanation: with the
exit of the rival, the preemption incentive is eliminated, and
adoption is slower.
"Prior Adoption" itself predicts a small hazard of adoption,
and is highly significant.This is consistent with preemption
stories -theloser in the adoption race adopts later than it would
otherwise.
VI. OTHER RESULTS
Table 5 considers other determinants of adoption. Column (1)
adds a dummy variable for whether or not a chapel of the IPPAU
existed in the market. The coefficient has an insignificant negative
sign. 16
The next couple of columns investigate the effects of
membership in a newspaper chain.There are a few reasons why one
are no more than two observations in which merger by
exit has occured, per year, and so no corresponding variable was
defined.
'6Compare Dertouzos and Quinn who find that unions have an
insignificant effect on adoption of photocomposition and video
display terminals.
19might suspect this to be relevant. Larger firms might be more or less
eager to adopt new technology: more, if they are greater resources to
do so, less if they are more bureaucratically hidebound or there are
problemsincoordination. The associated technology of
photocomposition also allowed composition to be physically separated
from printing (because of the elimination of the huge metal galleys)
which allowed the printing of several newspapers composed elsewhere
in one plant. However, this may have been more relevant for commonly
owned weekly newspapers, than daily ones.
Column (2) adds a dummy variable for membership in a chain,
defined as a group of newspapers serving at least two markets and
owned by the same firm. It has an insignificant effect. Column (3)
adds the number of newspapers in the chain.The variable is
insignifcant on its own, and jointly insignificant with the Chain
dummy (p-value =.19).Column(4) uses a set of chain dummies, with
the omitted dummy corresponding to those newspapers that are not
members of a chain.This allows us to test the weaker hypothesis
that the chain to which a newspaper belongs matters in some undefined
manner. The log-ratio test statistic for the exclusion of all 117
chain dummies is 198 with 116 degrees of variables, and so highly
significant. Thus either there are unobserved determinants that are
shared by commonly owned newspapers, or, more likely, the adoption
decision was taken at the firm level —withno greater or less
inclination towards adoption by chains, large or small.
One would also like to know whether there are technological
spillovers in adoption. Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1993) have
shown that patents tend to cite other patents whose originators
reside in the same area. Geographical spillovers in adoption should
be revealed by geographical clustering of initial adopters. The
newspaper industry is an ideal one to examine this issue as the
adopting industry is widely dispersed (more or less in proportion to
20population) and complementary inputs are not location specific. The
knowledge spillover in this case would probably not have been the
availability of offset -thatwould have been clear to anyone even
occasionally reading the trade press -butthe opportunity to see
offset work in practice.'7
Estimating spatial correlation in the presence of censored
variables is a difficult task. As a first approximation, I simply
add state dummies to the basic specification in Column (5) .These
are significant at the six percent level, with log-likelihood ratio
test of 66, with 50 degrees of freedom. The estimated coefficients
are shown in Table 6.There is a tendency for newspapers in non-
industrial states, such as Alaska, Georgia, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Alabama, Kansas, Vermont and Mississippi to adopt offset earlier than
one would otherwise predict, although Ohio is also an early adopter.
Spatial diffusion is still a possible explanation. One would
expect adoption to begin in those states where newspapers have a
greater incentive to adopt on their own, and these states (including
Ohio) are characterized by small newspapers. To model this process,
I allow the latent adoption time to depend not only on the market
structure and other determinants discussed above, but also on the
mean latent adoption time of other newspapers in the state. Thus
=Xb+cy1*+e=X1b+c(Xb)+fce+e}
'Oneway that technology diffuses through an industry is through
plant visits by managers of other, even competing, firms. The
Boston Globe executives to whom I spoke had just returned from a
visit to the Washington Post, to see the new technology being
installed there. They also claimed to have exchanged technical
information with the Boston Herald, and to have provided, and
have been provided with, technical assistance in emergency
systems to the competing firm.
21where a bold script indicates a mean taken over allobservations in
i's state, other than i itself. The parameter c measuresthe effects
of spillovers.The results of this estimation are presented in
column (7) of Table 5.It is clear that there is little evidence
that spillovers, if they exist, operate in that fashion.
Finally, Column (6) includes both sets of dummyvariables. The
basic findings on the market structure variables and circulation are
unaffected by their inclusion. Now the chain dummies are
insignificant (p-value =.19)and the state dummies only marginally
so (p-value =.11)
VII. CONCLUSION
The work described in this paper is very preliminary. Future
work will extend that discussed here in a number of ways.
First, the specification followed in this paper measureschain
membership and circulation at their 1960 values. But the l960sand
1970s saw a rise in chains. Although circulation remained relatively
constant, it would have fluctuated for individual newspapers.Hazard
estimation with time-dependent covariates can handle this temporal
variation. This approach has its own limitations, as it assumes that
all events subsequent to 1960 are not determined by future offset
adoption. The other major disadvantage with the hazard approachis
the much greater data requirements.
The linear specification is inappropriate because certain firms
could not have adopted the technology before a given data. Thus, in
the language of hazard functions, certain newspapers are not in the
tirisk set" in a given year. Of course, that reasoning follows a
technological push, rather than pull, perspective. But giventhat
the technology and its refinements originated outside of the industry
22(the press manufacturers), and were first applied in yet another
(commercial printing), that seems a not unreasonable working
assumption. 18
Second,it would be interesting to see whether other
technological adoptions follow the same pattern as that uncovered
here. Photocomposition is the obvious candidate, although finding
adequate measures for its adoption has so far proved elusive. The
complementarity between the two technologies can perhaps be captured
in a hazard analysis by including an indicator of past adoption of
the other technology in the hazard specification.
Third, I have begun to link the database created for this paper
to the Census Bureau!s Longitudinal Research Database (LRD),
specifically, establishments classified under SIC Code 2711-11. This
will allow me to use financial status, as measured by current and
past profit flows (Total Value of Shipments minus Costs), and
technical efficiency, as measured by newspaper costs/(circulation
times the number of pages), as independent determinants of adoption.
This will allow me to address an additional explanation for the
market structure results, that investment is constrained by cash flow
and that duopolists (especially smaller ones) were less profitable
than monopolists were. The LRD also provides indirect measures of
offset adoption through reports of the types of inks and plates used
by the establishments.
'8Scott, 1987, p. 30.
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Duopoly -0.4 -0.4 -0.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
[0.6] [0.7] [0.9]
SmallDuopolist -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
[0.4] [0.5] [0.4]
2-Newspaper Monopoly -0.2 -0.2 -0.16
(0.1) (0.1) (0.12)
[0.8] [0.8] [0.9]
Ln(Circulation) -Sum -0.6 -0.6 -0.7
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
[0.5] [0.5] [0.5]
Former Duopoly -0.8 -1.1
(0.7) (0.7)
[0.4] [0.3]
Prior Adoption in Market -1.1
(0.4)
[0.3]
Log-likelihood -8555 -8554 -8548
Number of observations is 1549, of which 87 are left censored at year (19)64, 898 are uncensored, and 564
are right censored at year 19(77). Values in square brackets are coefficients are in exponential form.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Alabama is the omitted dummy variable.
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Kaplan-Meler survival estimates, by SD
70 75
SD 0 - Large Duopolist, SD 1 - Small Duopolist
Figure 3